The ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional)

The ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional) is Colombia’s oldest and largest guerrilla group. The leftist army has a presence across many of the country’s departments, but is particularly concentrated on and around the Venezuelan border as well as on the Pacific coast.

The ELN emerged out of Colombia’s violent civil war as a guerrilla force inspired by the Cuban revolution. Over many decades, it has evolved into a complex criminal structure involved in drug trafficking, illegal mining, extortion, and kidnapping.

The group still maintains its ideological identity, but its purported revolutionary objectives are complicated by the money it makes from Colombia’s illegal industries.

The ELN has 6,500 fighters according to a recent Colombian intelligence estimate, as cited by El País.

Within the Venezuelan states of Táchira, Apure, Bolívar, and Amazonas, the ELN reportedly has around 1,400 fighters, roughly 20% of its total.

History (Origins and Evolution Relevant to 2023–2025 Context)

The ELN is the oldest active guerrilla organization in Latin America, founded in 1964 by university students and intellectuals inspired by the Cuban Revolution.

In the 1960s, the Cuban government invited a small group of socialist students and activists to train on the island in the techniques of guerrilla warfare and “foco” ideology, a revolutionary approach emphasizing the ability of a small band of fighters to inspire a larger revolution.

Among those students were the seedlings of the ELN, including its leader, Fabio Vásquez Castaño. Those early fighters announced themselves in January 1965 by briefly occupying the unsuspecting, otherwise unremarkable town of Simacota, in Santander.

Over the next couple of years, the ELN, operating primarily out of the small town of San Vicente de Chucurí, grew from 24 to around 250 fighters. They established a presence in Magdalena Medio, the south of Bolívar, and the northeast of Antioquia.

In 1972, the Misael Pastrana presidency decided to wipe out this emerging threat in an all-out assault code-named Operation Anorí, which exterminated all of the group’s leaders.

The ELN fled Antioquia, settling into the more obscure regions in the south of Bolívar and Arauca, in the border regions with Venezuela.

But the guerrillas were not completely destroyed. New leaders emerged in the form of a Spanish priest called Manuel Pérez, alias “El Cura,” and Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista, alias “Gabino,” who continues to be key to this day.

Together, “Gabino” and “El Cura” restructured the ELN’s finances and military structures. They expanded in the late 70s and 80s into the states of Casanare and Boyacá near the Colombian border with Venezuela.

The ELN also built up a presence in Southern Colombia, in the states of Putumayo and Nariño.

During this period, the ELN reached the peak of its violence, financing itself with kidnapping and extortion.

In 1991, the ELN was investigated for the murders of journalists Julio Daniel Chaparro and Jorge Torres in Segovia, which concluded that three members of the Central Command (COCE) were behind the killings.

In 1999, the ELN kidnapped 190 people from a church in Cali, the biggest kidnapping event in Colombia’s history. They also hijacked a plane, forcing it to land in southern Bolívar and holding its passengers hostage.

Between 1994 and 1998, the ELN entered into the first of many peace negotiations with the Colombian state. They did not work out.

But this initial failure did not stop either side from trying again, many times.

From 2005 to 2007, the ELN were in negotiations until disrupted by worsening diplomatic relations between Colombia and Venezuela.

In 2014, President Juan Manuel Santos restarted negotiations with the ELN while also negotiating peace with the then-more-powerful FARC guerrillas.

The negotiations with FARC were successful, with most FARC fighters demobilizing in 2016.

But talks with the ELN continued unsuccessfully until Santos left office and was replaced by the more hawkish Iván Duque. The Duque administration ended the peace process following a 2019 ELN attack on a police academy in Bogotá.

Peace talks then restarted in 2022 after Gustavo Petro took office as Colombia’s first left-wing president. Petro’s “Paz Total” aims to negotiate the demobilization of a range of armed groups, including the ELN.

However, talks began to falter as a substructure within the ELN called the “Comuneros del Sur” separated from the ELN and began a separate peace process. The ELN’s Central Command viewed the negotiations with its renegade front as a betrayal by the Colombian state.

Peace efforts ultimately collapsed when the insurgency launched a military offensive in the Catatumbo region in January 2025, aiming to expel the 33rd Front of FARC dissidents and seize control of another strategic area along the binational border with Venezuela.

Ideology, Political Project, and What Differentiates the ELN

The ELN’s original ideological influences were the Cuban Revolution and Liberation Theology. This Catholic religious tradition holds that the unjust economic and social structures that produce poverty are sinful and that each believer has an obligation to transform them.

Several of the group’s early members were Catholic priests who viewed political violence as necessary to address poverty and inequality. The most famous example is Camilo Torres, a priest who died soon after joining the ELN but who has since become a mythic founding father for the armed group.

The group has historically important relationships with peasant communities, which have been an important part of the organization’s ability to project power and maintain territorial control disproportionate to their size at various points in its history.

The ELN exercises social control over rural communities, often using violence and the infiltration of local government through corruption and political funding to secure its position.

It also sometimes offers social services to the populations under its control in Venezuela and Colombia, administers dispute resolution, and collects “taxes.”

For ideological reasons, the ELN for several decades refused to participate in the drug trade. Recently, this has shifted, and the ELN now operates many coca processing laboratories within its territories.

As the ELN has evolved and the Cold War context has faded, the question of its current ideological commitments is hotly contested among experts, journalists, and politicians.

The group participates heavily in criminal economies, including narcotrafficking, and there is a clear emphasis on maintaining territorial control. It is unclear what kind of revolutionary objective the ELN can hope to achieve in the current political context. The days of revolutionary cadres overthrowing dictatorships and setting up communist regimes are distant.

But reducing the ELN to “just a drug cartel” as some commentators do is inaccurate. The relationship between the ELN and the Venezuelan state clearly has a political dimension, even as both entities become less ideological and more pragmatic.

The ELN also uses tactics and methods of control that are uncommon for drug cartels. The use of armed strikes and, recently, explosives sets them apart from drug trafficking organizations like the Clan del Golfo.

Colombian magazine Semana claimed in 2021 to have access to documents from the ELN in which the group strategized “a national conduction of masses” as a way to exercise political power.

It is possible to come up with practical, cynical explanations for armed strikes. But then, why do purely narcotrafficking organizations not use them?

Leadership and Organizational Structure

The ELN is led by a Central Command (COCE) comprising 5 military leaders, who have remained largely the same individuals for several decades. “El Cura,” who died in 1998, is the major exception. This is a remarkable level of stability compared to other armed groups, where leaders often survive for only a few years.

The five members of the Central Command are

Eliécer Herlinto Chamorro Acosta (‘Antonio García’) – commander-in-chief
Israel Ramírez Pineda (‘Pablo Beltrán’) – the chief negotiator
Gustavo Aníbal Giraldo Quinchía (‘Carlos Marín Guarín’ or ‘Pablito’) – commander of the Eastern War Front and liaison between the central command and the War Fronts.
Jaime Galvis Rivera (“Ariel”) – responsible for the finances of the Eastern War Front
Ramiro Vargas – the ELN’s financier

Long-time leader Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista, alias ‘Gabino’, stepped down in 2021 due to illness but persists in an advisory role. He was the group’s primary leader since the 1970s.

‘Pablo Beltrán’ is perhaps the most prominent public figure, as he leads negotiations with the Colombian government (when they are happening) and often speaks publicly on behalf of the group.

The ELN also has a secondary body elected by the eight war fronts, the National Directorate (Dirección Nacional – DINAL). It has 23 members.

The ELN’s on-the-ground fighters are divided into eight different “war fronts,” all of which operate as a command structure for several individual fronts that operate underneath them. They are as follows:

Northeastern War Front – Operates in Norte de Santander and Cesar in Colombia and across the border in Venezuela’s Zulia state. Leonel Salazar Roa, alias “Gonzalo Satélite,” is the group’s leader.
Northern War Front – Operates in La Guajira, Cesar, Magdalena, and Atlántico in Colombia, and also in Zulia and Táchira in Venezuela. Alias “El Poeta” is the group’s current leader.
The Eastern War Front – : The Eastern War Front is the ELN’s largest single force, operating on the border with Venezuela and within Venezuela’s territory. It is thought to have more than a thousand fighters, dwarfing any other front. The Eastern War Front operates in Arauca, Boyacá, Vichada, Guainía, and Casanare. It was previously led by “Pablito,” who remains a powerful influence in the front.
The Jesús Darío Ramírez Castro War Front – Operates in Antioquia and Southern Bolívar.
The Western War Front – Operates in Chocó and Risaralda and is led by Emilce Oviedo Sierra (Martha, La Abuela).
National Urban War Front – The Urban War Front operates in 10 major cities and is led in the field by alias “El Rolo,” allegedly responsible for several bombings over the past several years in Cali. The Urban War Front is technically led by“Ariel,” but he is in the ELN’s central command.
Southwestern War Front – Operates in the Colombian departments of Nariño and Cauca.
Central War Front – Operates in Tolima, Risaralda, and Antioquia.

The organization is then divided into individual fronts that each operate a separate territory. These fronts range in size from 25 to several hundred fighters. While loyal to the Central Command and its War Front, each front operates with a degree of latitude. Below is a non-exhaustive list of some of the more notable ELN fonts.

The Darío Ramírez Front: Operates in Bolívar, Santander, and Antioquia, generating revenue from drug trafficking and illegal mining.
Luis Carlos Cárdenas Arbeláez Front: This front is led by alias “el Mono” and operates in Buenaventura on Colombia’s Pacific coast.
Juan Fernando Porras Martínez: Led by alias “Caballo de Guerra,”
Domingo Laín Front: Operates in Arauca.
Che Guevara Front: The Che Guevara front is led by an alias “Jerson,” and is thought to be responsible for more than 20+ terrorist attacks since 2017.
Comuneros del Sur Front: led by Gabriel Yépez Mejía, alias “HH,” and operates in Nariño. The Comuneros del Sur is at risk of splitting from the Central Command and potentially demobilizing, ceasing communications with them for over a year. The front was established in 1992.
Ómar Gómez: Led by “Fabián” and operating in Chocó, specifically the municipalities of Istmina, Litoral del San Juan, Medio San Juan, Sipí, and Nóvita.

Negotiations with the Colombian State (Talks, Ceasefire Mechanisms, Compliance, and Breakdowns

Negotiations between the ELN and the Colombian government were suspended in January of 2025 after conflict with the 33rd Front of FARC Dissidents in Catatumbo triggered the displacement of around 53,000 people and killed 117.

A ceasefire in August of 2024 was ended after the ELN perpetrated 15 attacks, including a major attack against a military base in Puerto Jordán, Arauca. In response, President Petro formally suspended peace negotiations.

During negotiations in Caracas, Havana, and Mexico City, the ELN and the Colombian government agreed to two six-month bilateral ceasefires. The final ceasefire ended in August of 2024, and the ELN began attacks against the public forces.

In April of 2024, the ELN suspended the seventh cycle of peace negotiations because they accused the government of breaching the terms of negotiations. The Government of Nariño reportedly established direct contact with the Comuneros del Sur Front, which is a semi-rebelious front that has severed connections with the central command.

Relationship with Venezuela

The ELN has maintained a substantial presence in the Venezuelan state of Apure, on the border with Colombia, since it was pushed back by military operations in the 1980s and 90s.

The area is a hub for illegal mining, which is a key revenue stream for the group. Venezuela also serves as a transport hub for cocaine from Colombia, which is trafficked into the country by the ELN and other groups and then moved on to Central America and ultimately the United States.

The Eastern War Front is the ELN’s main operational structure within Apure, which operates in coordination with fronts in Táchira and Zulia in Venezuela and Catatumbo in Colombia, moving cocaine and weapons across the border.

Venezuela’s border regions serve as a rearguard and sanctuary from Colombia’s security forces. At the moment, the socialist government in Venezuela tolerates the existence of the ELN in this region, making the group’s position in Venezuela more secure than across the border, where it must fight FARC and state forces.

Several high-ranking members of the ELN are thought to be sheltering within Venezuela’s territory, including, according to Colombian authorities, Antonio García.

As early as 1999 (when the Chavez came to power in Venezuela), high-ranking officials in the Venezuelan regime, notably Diosdado Cabello and Ramón Rodríguez Chacín, are believed to have established strategic agreements with both the FARC and the ELN, according to US indictments. Under Hugo Chávez, both groups were allowed latitude to operate within Venezuela’s borders and occasionally provided with logistical and military support.

Allies, Enemies, and Inter-Group Dynamics

It is very difficult ot write clearly about the relationship between the ELN and other major armed groups like the various FARC dissident factions and Clan del Golfo at a state-wide level. This is because strategic dynamics are extremely regionally specific.

FARC, for example, is split into 30+ individual fronts that operate almost entirely as separate groups. Many fronts are affiliated together under a leader like Iván Mordisco, Calarcá, or as part of the Segunda Marquetalia. But even these operate with a lot of independence.

The ELN is more centralized, but individual fronts still retain a degree of freedom. An ELN front in one state may be waging territorial war against its local EMC-aligned FARC front, while a different EMC front in a different state maintains a tenuous alliance with its local ELN faction against the local Clan del Golfo grouping. (The EMC is another term for the FARC fronts that follow Iván Mordisco).

For this reason, we are going to analyze the ELN’s relationship with other groups by looking at the local dynamics in a few high-activity regions of Colombia.

Norte de Santander/Catatumbo

The ELN and the 33rd Front of the FARC dissidents, affiliated with the EMBF, are competing for control of Catatumbo, a strategically positioned region in Norte de Santander, near the border with Venezuela. This conflict has killed over 150 people and triggered a crisis of displacement in the region.

In 2025, the ELN attacked the 33rd Front, triggering in a couple of weeks the displacement of 36,000 people. Larger estimates indicate that displacement numbers may range as high as 55,000 or 64,000.

To fight the 33rd Front, the ELN had redirected fighters from other areas further south in Colombia.

The two groups, along with a much smaller guerrilla outfit, the EPL, had previously been able to maintain a power-sharing agreement in Catatumbo. But this arrangement collapsed.

The Urban Front Carlos Germán Velázquez Villamizar operates in Norte de Santander and generates one billion pesos of revenue from cocaine trafficking and production, according to the Colombian military.

Catatumbo and Norte de Santander are a critical region for cocaine production, with regular seizures of cocaine production laboratories operated by the ELN.

Norte de Santander and Cesar were historically the territory of the now-greatly-reduced Popular Liberation Army (EPL). However, the ELN has supplanted the EPL as the major force in the region.

For some time, the ELN maintained a tense peace with the 33rd Front of the FARC dissidents, led by Calarcá. This allowed both groups to maintain control in the region and resist the advances of the drug trafficking group Clan del Golfo.

However, earlier this year (2026), the agreement collapsed, triggering a massive outbreak of violence.

Arauca/Apure (Venezuela)

Elsewhere, in Arauca, the ELN is fighting a different set of FARC fronts, the 10th and 28th Fronts. This is also a war for territorial control, especially of border regions. In early 2022, the ELN allegedly killed around 50 people associated with the FARC fronts.

On September 17 of 2024, the ELN and the 10th and 28th fronts reportedly orchestrated an attack in the municipality of Arauquita in Arauca against a military base, killing 5 soldiers.

Kidnapping activity by the ELN is particularly rampant in Arauca. In 2023, there were 110 registered kidnappings by the ELN in the region, according to the Ombudsman.

The Domingo Laín of the ELN is led by Raúl and operates in Arauca, funded mainly from extortions against ranchers and oil companies in the region.

In 2019, the ELN reached a non-aggression agreement with the 10th Front of FARC dissidents, aligned with the EMC, in Arauca, Boyacá, and Casanare.

In 2022, a territorial dispute broke out between the 10th Front and the ELN’s Domingo Laín Front in Arauca and Apure.

Peace between the ELN and another FARC dissident faction, the Segunda Marquetalia, in Venezuela’s Apure and Amazonas states, fractured when the ELN killed José Manuel Sierra Sabogal, alias “Zarco Aldinever,” the dissident faction’s second-in-command, in August 2025.

Vichada

In Vichada, the ELN is in conflict with FARC fronts associated with the Segunda Marquetalia over control of cross-border routes for gold and coltan. The two groups had previously maintained a tenuous alliance, which appears to have broken down. As in other regions, fighting between the ELN and Segunda Marquetalia has triggered a wave of displacements in the areas around Garcitas, Aceitico, and Puerto Nariño.

Antioquia

In other parts of Colombia, the ELN appears to have some form of alliance with the EMC, another confederation of FARC fronts. The ELN and the 4th, 18th, and 36th Fronts are working together to fight the state and Clan del Golfo across northern Antioquia.

In December of 2025, the ELN enforced an armed strike in Antioquia (as well as other departments of the country enforcing the curfew by burning a bus on the road near the town of Valdivia.

Nariño

The Manuel Vásquez Castaño Front of the ELN operates in the northern part of the department.

A specific zone called the Triángulo de Telembí, which includes the municipalities of Barbacoas, Magüí Payán, and Roberto Payán, is a hotspot for organised crime.

In Valle del Cauca, Cauca, and Nariño, the ELN is fighting against various EMC-aligned FARC dissident fronts. In this region, the ELN has fewer fighters and so collaborates with the Segunda Marquetalia.

Chocó

In Chocó, the ELN is attempting to establish control over mineral and drug trafficking routes in the Bajo San Juan Region. In response, Clan del Golfo and the FARC fronts aligned with Iván Mordisco are both fighting the ELN.

Clan del Golfo is successfully expanding into territories previously held by the ELN. In February of 2025, partly in response, the ELN announced an armed strike that forcibly confined civilians to their homes.

Cauca

The ELN’s Southwestern War Front operates in Cauca, contesting control of coca production and drug trafficking routes with the EMC. To counter the EMC, the ELN has allied with the Segunda Marquetalia.

The ELN has been conducting a sustained offensive in the port city of Buenaventura, blocking the main highway connecting Cali to the country’s largest port. As a result of ELN attacks in Buenaventura in mid-2025, over 4,000 people were confined to their homes.

Bolívar

Bolívar is a major hub for illegal gold and mineral mining. The ELN’s Jesús Darío Ramírez Castro War Front operates in the south of Bolívar. The ELN and the EMC are aligned against the Clan del Golfo.

The ELN is encroaching on Clan del Golfo territory in San Lucas, which houses valuable artisanal gold fields. In the municipalities of Arenal, Montecristo, Cantagallo, and Santa Rosa, civilians have been confined to their homes, and access to food and medical care is limited.
In November of 2025, the ELN reportedly perpetrated a massacre of 5 people at a gold mine in the village of El Jardín.