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What do recent airstrikes tell us about Petro’s changing approach to organised crime?

On July 10th, the Colombian military conducted a bombing campaign in the Bajo Cauca region of Antioquia targeting a Clan del Golfo encampment. Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez stated that the operation killed 30-40 members of irregular groups (the specific groups were not specified).

These bombings were originally reported to have occurred near Valdivia, but in reality took place in Briceno.

This attack is the third in a series of aerial operations targeting Clan del Golfo in northern Antioquia.  On March 25, the Colombian military carried out an airstrike in Segovia that killed nine Clan del Golfo members, captured another, and seized 13 rifles. 

In December of 2024, the first bombing took place in Cáceres to target Clan del Golfo positions. Four soldiers died during the campaign, reportedly due to an accident. This was the first aerial campaign conducted in Antioquia since Petro assumed office.

While common under previous governments, aerial bombing campaigns represent a change of strategy for the Petro administration. As part of the “Paz Total” program, the government has sought negotiated demobilization agreements with Colombia’s key armed groups, including Clan del Golfo.

However, this approach has come under criticism recently as opponents argue a lack of state muscle has allowed armed groups space to operate more freely. A growing territorial contest between the ELN and Clan del Golfo in Bajo Cauca serves as glaring evidence for this. 

Clan del Golfo painted a political target on their backs by conducting a targeted campaign of violence against soldiers and police officers, a continuation of the 2022 Plan Pistola campaign. 

Petro has defended his approach to reducing violence through negotiations. However, appearing to take decisive action against Clan del Golfo has likely become a priority to shore up his political legitimacy. 

The president has publicly stated that a failure to return to the negotiating table would result in a bombing campaign. To quote, “si no son capaces de desmantelarse, como lo hemos solicitado, serán destruidos por el Estado” or in English: “If they are not capable of dismantling themselves as we have requested, they will be destroyed by the state.”

Strategically, aerial operations are probably intended to support the peace process. By targeting Clan del Golfo’s military capacity by bombing weapons caches and camps, these operations should serve as a “stick” to encourage the group to return to negotiations.

In the long run, the goal of these operations is likely to weaken Clan del Golfo enough to seek a negotiated peace. But in the short term, they serve as a political response to criticism that the administration has been too weak on criminal actors.

It is also not an accident that these operations have been clustered in Bajo Cauca, a region of Antioquia, a few hours north of Medellin that serves as one of Colombia’s main narco-trafficking routes.

Due to its geography on the Cauca and Nechí rivers, Bajo Cauca cuts a natural corridor between coca-producing regions in Eastern Colombia and departure points on the Pacific and Caribbean coasts. 

The region is also a major coca producer, with nearly 4,688 hectares of farmland dedicated to coca production in 2019. The region is also a major hub of illicit mining, accounting for 60% of Antioquia’s gold extraction.

Between January and September 2024, approximately 11.64 metric tons of gold were extracted in Bajo Cauca, representing 54% of gold output in Antioquia and 41% of Colombia’s national production.

These geographic conditions have long made Bajo Cauca a magnet for armed groups. Many of the villages in the region have been historically controlled by guerrillas, either the FARC or the ELN.

More recently, Clan del Golfo has expanded to be the main player in the region, displacing the ELN from much of their territory through a protracted military offensive. 

But recently, there have been reports from anonymous sources that the ELN is allying with dissident FARC fronts operating under the banner of the Estado Mayor Central (EMC). There have been several cases of the ELN attacking Clan del Golfo positions in Bajo Cauca over the past few months.

One unintended effect of the selective bombing of Clan del Golfo positions by the state may be that it weakens the group’s ability to fend off the ELN and FARC’s efforts. This could lead to a more protracted territorial spat if it weakens the CdG to the point of being a more even match for the ELN and FARC dissidents. 

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